GENERAL BACKGROUND OF INDEXATION
Indexation, or index-linking, refers to proposals to link the number of dollars to be delivered on a contract to changes in some specified price index. Under indexation, money would continue to be used as a medium of exchange and as a measure of value, but not necessarily as a standard for deferred payments. In the event that the purchasing power of the dollar changed as indicated by an agreed-upon price index, contracts would be honored in terms of a unit of con- stant purchasing power over "goods and services in general." Thus, an index-linked contract to deliver $100 a year from today would deliver $110 if prices rose by 10 percent over the interval, that is, if the purchasing power of the dollar declined by Q09 percent.
Coverage
The basic objective of indexation is the insulation of contractually-created claims on output from the effects of changes in the purchasing power of money over goods and services in general (inflation or deflation). In a completely indexed world, all of the following would he indexed: all private and public wage and loan contracts including deposits at thrift institutions, insurance, and pension contracts; social security and other transfer payments, including unemployment compensation; and, of course, government tax receipts. With respect to taxes, indexation would apply mainly to income taxes by adjusting the level of exemption, the tax brackets, and the base of asset valuations. The progressive income tax rate itself would remain invariant for a given social decision regarding the relative size of the government sector. Since profit shares are noncontractual items and are 'With changes in relative prices, the constant purchasing power of money over "goods and services in general" necessarily implies variable purchasing power over at least some of the goods and services in the basket; that is, with relative price changes, the "index number problem" inevitably creeps in. See Ragnar Frisch, "Annual Sun'ey of Economic Theory: The Problem of Index Numbers," Econometrica (1936), pp. 1-38.
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determined residually, they would not be indexed.' However, to the extent that such contracts as those for purchases of materials are indexed, it appears likely' that profit shares of some intermediate goods producers would be indirectly protected through indexation.
Even money would be indexed under a completely indexed economy.
4 In a pure currency economy without private money producers (banks), indexation of currencies could he facilitated by dating them, such as Sylvio Gessell's sttunp money proposal.' With bankcreated money and legal reserve requirements, the task would be more difficult and would require frequent intervention by the central bank,
Experiences With Indexation
A review of foreign experience with regard to indexation shows a wide variety of practices with respect to the classes of contracts indexed, the extent of the compensation allowed, and the choices of indices to svhich the contracts~are tied.°l'he most coinprehensive indexation was provided initially by Finland and then by Israel, France, and most recently by Brazil. In addition to employment contracts, various loan, insurance, and pension contracts have been tied to a number of price indices as well as to the price of specific foreign exchange and commodities, such as that of gold Napoleons in tile case of France. The People's Republic of China first introduced the indexation of bank deposits in 1949, followed by Finland in 1955 , and more recently by Brazil in 1965.
Experience with indexing loan contracts in the United States and the United Kingdom has been scanty. Irving Fisher prevailed cr1 the Rand Kardex Company in 1925 to issue bonds tied to the wholesale price index, but these bonds were soon converted into preferred stocks and ordinary bonds. 
I-ndexation Helps Ach-ie-ce P-rice Level Stabil-ity
Traditionally, the advocacy of indexation was based on distributive equity and, to a lesser degree, on allocative efficiency grounds.
1 ' Recently, a tllird climension, based on a diagnosis of the tmderlynlg cause of modern inflation, has been added. The modem day proponents of indexation, represented by Professor Friedman, have thrown in a sweetener. They claim that indexatioml would tend to restore price level stability in an existimlg inflationary situation. Their position can be interpreted to he based on tlmeir implicit diagnosis that inflation is a political pllenomenon.'" tm Their argument would run as follows. Inflation occurs as a result of all increase in a nations mone-y stock ill excess of tile ability of the economy' to produce gcods and services. Usually' the initial force leading to nlflation is increased demand for government expenditures to aid var;ons sectors of tile economy or segments of tile population. Those demanchng greater government services may not even he aware of the inflationary consequences of their actions. It is only necessary that in striving to better tlleir relative ahld absolute tm4 Given imperfect foresight, a variable monetamy yardstick implienl hy a fluctuating pm-ice level ) increases the nriecrtainty-associated rvitil ally-monetary contract and, assuming aversion to purchasing power risk, increases the cost of reaching agreement, 5 Robert Clower, "The Keynesian Counterrevolution: A The- The teniss "political phenomenon" was coined by Robinson in the article. The juxtaposition of the term, with the resnlting imnpheations for indezation, is that of the author's.
positiosms they induce an accommodating increase in the nominai money stock whicil is faster tllan would he consistent with price level stability.
In this interpretation of tileir view, although the villain fostering tlse inflation is the public demasmdiug more from governnment, the basic cause is much deeper, It is imbedded in our systenm of "advocacy politics."
tmm Those who are ultimately resposmsible for inflation are those who succeed in inducing the government to try to command a greater share of society's resources than is explicitly provided for in tax laws.
THE CASE PRESENTED

AGAINST INDEXATJON
1-listorically, indexation has been proposed at times of on-going and relatively high rates of price change.
The case gesmerally advanced agaissst such a proposal has been based primarily on the fact that we do not start with a "cleass sheet of paper to write upon."
Since at any moment there exist otststanding contracts which are not indexed, it is argued that indexathin would tend to cause problems for those individuals ammd institutions involved in sttch contracts.
An additional standard argument against the indexing proposal lsas been timat the adoption of suclm a proposal would tend to weaken stspport for anti-inflation policies. More recently, some have contended that indexation would tend to affect adversely the tenns of international trade for an open economy.
The following statements were made by the Council of Econonmic Advisers and others in 1952 in opposition to the proposed issuance of a purchasing power bond by the Treasury. These statements are representative of the arguments used against indexation in generai.mo
Wo-uld weaken support for anti-i-nflation actions
The issuance of a purchasing power bond would imply a defeatist attitude toward the problem of inflation. Widespread ownership of purchasing power bonds would add another group to those who think timemselves sheltered from the effects of inflation, and would weaken public support of a stabilization program.
The proposal for purchasing power bonds applies the principle only to a limited amount of bnsnds.
'rhe Covensment would thus add an admittedly attm5 George P. Shmsltz. 'Reflections on Political Economy," Journal of Finance (May 1974) . pp. 323-30. iiftj5 Congress, Joint Committee on the Economic Report, Monetary Policy arid the Managernermt of time Public Debt, Part 2, 82nd. Cong-, 2nd. sess., 1952 Cong-, 2nd. sess., , pp. 888-89, 1097 Cong-, 2nd. sess., , 1109 traotive feature to one type of securi~'offered to the public ill competition with other Covenmmemst bonds and such other forms of assets or contracts as ctsrrency, demand, time and savings accounts, shares in sivings and loan associatiosms, and hfe insurance policies. It is very likely that great pressure would develop to extend the purchasing power clause also to other investments, public asmd private. The greater the number of persons who considered themselves shielded from inflation, the greater wotmld be the possibility of its occurrence.
Would ha-em sons-c individuals a-nd institutions
The demerits of the proposal are clear and compelling. First the issuance of a Govensment bond, the value of which was gsmaranteed in terms of purchasing power, would place other forms of fixedimitert-st issvestmemlt at a nlecided disadm-antage and would jeopardize the continued existence of such other forms of investment. Tlmere would be raised, therefore, the serious problem of fairness to savers who already had their savings programs in effect.
Moreover, it appears inevitable that the adoption 0 f a constant purchasing power Government bond would lead to a disastrous collapse in the value of outstanding investment media.
Would be difficult to choose appropriate index
The determination of the index measuring the price at which tlme bonds would be repaid would present technical diffienslties and -no matter how decidedwould result in popular dissatisfaction.
Would weaken Icr-ms of international trade
A new dimensiosm is-I ternms of an open economy cosmtext lmas been injected recently. Based on time premise that~ndexation would accelerate inflation, Professor Murray L. Weidenbanm ohiects to indexation on the ground tlmat:
We do not live in a closed economy. \-Ve already have seen that accelerating inflation at home means devaluation of our currency abroad. That brings deter~om-atiorsin the terms r~f tranie annl nleciines in onsn real stm-mmmdard of liviugdo ASSESSMENT OF THE ARGUMENTS Botls sides of time niehate appear to agree tlmat (1) amm inflationless alternative is ideal, and tlmat (2) indexation would prevemmt time emnergenee of inflationinduced distributional effects (making "living wmth inflation" easier).
As mentioned earlier, time proponents tend to ignore time transitional costs involved in adopting ismdexation, wimile time opponesmts tend to emphasize time likely-effects on the viahility of certain existing institutions. \-Vitlm regard to the inflationary implications of adoptismg immdexatiosm, time proponents and tIme opponents are diametrically opposed.
To lmeip assess time pros ammd comms of indexatiosm, let us first speculate on the properties of an idealized, completely immdexed ecosmomy. Such speculation would help to illuminate time possihie diffi'cuities accompanying any period of transition to mmecessarily iess-tlmanconmpiete indexation.am
Some Properties of a Completely Indexed Economy
Relative Price Changes -It might appear that in a completely indexed economy, the relative prices of various goods and services wouId remain constant, Indexation, however, does not immunize a producer from the risk of clmanges in relative prices incident to changes in preferences, technology, or weatimer. A set of relative (output) prices would still guide the allocation of resources. Indexation is designed to insure only the equality between time realized and the contracted claims on output for the hired factors of production.
Government's Claims On Resources -The sham-c of resources commanded by and flowing through the government xvould ideally not deviate much from time level that the pubhc "voluntarily" transfers through its pledges of current and future tax payments. The government would he deprived of the power to collect inflationary taxes fronm time populace. Tlme income tax system, witim ismdexed exemptions, asset revaluations, and indexed tax brackets, would lose a considerable amousmt of "built-in" stabili?-ation potency widely thougimt to be associated with a progressive tax structure.
22 However, simould tIme government attempt, through continued creation of money, to command more real resources than timose tendered in explicit tax payments and private-sector lending, inflation would persist and the price level could approacim infinity. informational Efficiency of Markets -More extensive use of time markets would he esmcouraged under indexation for inter-tenmporal exchange asmd transformation of resources. To the extesmt tlmat the costs of collecting asmd processing time immformation regarding productive opportunities' -are lowereni tlmrosmgim market exclmammge, real output wotmlni be issereasenh for a givesm structure of preferesmccs asmd a given state of tecimsmology.
Existence of inflation
Risk-free Asset -hmdexation provides assets which are free of purcimasing power risks. A short-tenmm monetary asset in this regime, such as Treasury bills, wonId be free of purchasing power risk in addition to default ammd relative price risk associated with cimammges imm interest rates. Time availability of sucim arm asset would rescue snucim of time timeoretical results of the snodermm capital pricismg asmni portfolio cimoice theories whielm are predicated on time existemmce of a riskiess asset. 24 
Potential Impact of Indexation on Inflation
Ahthouglm indexation, by itself, would not prevent price level changes, the advocates appear to believe tmm For a nhiseussiums of short-ammnl loimg-rumm Phillips cnn'es, see indexatiosm would reduce imsfiation by reducing the pressure for inflationary policies asmd by making antiinflationary policies more palatable. The opponents of the proposal argue that indexation is likely to exacerbate inflation siimce by removing its stimmg, time constituency for anti-inflationary policies would he weakened. They recomnnmend more resolute anti-inflation policies, but seldom provide aim analysis of the underlying force driving inflatiomm.
Wlmat is critically nmissimmg imm time argumesmt tlmat indexation would lead to accelerating inflation is the asmalysis of win' ismflation occurs. 1mm time absence of any ammaiysis as to time immcesmtives asmd time meclmammics of inflation, a case based on the fears of accelerating inflation (which is conceded to be "functioniess" in terms of distributive benefits) is not very persuasive.
As noted earlier, time proponents provide such an analysis of inflation in terms of advocacy pohtics and the share of resources commasmded by the government. From this perspective of the diagnosis of inflation, it is the government-deficit-induced increase in the nominal money stock which underwrites persistent inflation. The issue fundammmentai to the inflationary implication of indexation, then, may be posed as: is indexation more likely to lead to time abatenment of pressures for policies whicis lead to inflation? 'rime advocates of immdexation answer the query affirmatively. They cite the reduced incentives to promote inflationary policies under indexation as well as the asserted reduction in the costs of anti-inflation policies to bolster their case. Their case would be more persuasive if one could accept tlmeir inmplicit premise that taking the "honey" out of ismflation would reduce the pressures for policies wlmich are likely to lead to deficits, excessive mrmonetary groxvth, and the entailed inflation. As was touched upon earlier imm discussing the inflationary implication of moving into complete indexatiosm from time immitial commdition of immflatiosmary disequilibrium, their inmplicit prenmise is not based on a firm foundation.
Why Attempt to Reduce Inflation Under
Complete Indexation?
The modern proponents of indexation seldom make explicit what additional benefits they perceive for the asserted abatenment of inflation if its distributional effects are neutralized under indexation. Passing references to the nuisance of bookkeeping changes are made. However, the possible gain in allocative efficiency associated witlm time inflationless solutions alluded to earlier is seldom made. If, as the proponents argue, OCTOBER 1974 indexatiomm mmeutrahzes tlme distributive effects of immflation, isn't the presumned ammti-inflation benefit of indexing simply superfious without some anmphfication of time effects on resource allocation and balance-ofpayments developments?
In evnfiuatimmg time imalasmce-of-paymmments effects, one must take ismto commsideratiomm time prevai]ismg foreigmm exchammge rate systenm and wimether or not indexation will lead to more or less inflation. Under a freelyfluctuating exchange rate system, the case for indexatiomm would mmot be affecteni by its balance-of-payments effects, regardless of its effects on inflation; exchange rates would simply change to reflect clmanging rates of inflation. Under a fixed excimammge rate system, however, the case for indexation wouid be greatly attenuated if it results ism accelerated inflation, as some opponents contend. This is so since time likely consequences would include increased restrictions on product and capital flows to cope witim the emerging baiance-of-paymesmts difficulties.
A Recent Experience With Indexatio-n and Inflation
Some of the proponents of indexation have cited the example of Brazil as a ease in which adoption of indexation lmas both reduced inflation and increased growth of output. Interpretations differ as to the role that iimdexatiosm playeni in time Braziliaim "miracle." Friednman suggests timat indexatiosm cosmtributed both to accelerated growtim assd decelerated inflation. Both Waiter W. Heller and Ronald A. Krieger tend to emphasize the ineidesmtal contribution of indexation to growth. Timey assert that tIme main spring of growth was the enforced redistribution of immeome to capital from labor which could have occurred only in a regimented command ecosmonmy. Tlmey leave ummexplaismed the deceleration of inflation.
Our reading of the Brazihan experience suggests that botim occurresmces are time predictable effects of conscious policy choices muade by the government with the tacit approval of the populace. Time government of Brazil replaced inflationary taxation as the domninant form of a savings-investment tecimnology in 1964 with financing through capital nmarkets and direct taxation.
25 The motive for timis action was the realization timat time yield of ismflationary finasmee lmad atrophied alarmimmgiy as people increasingly made adjusbmmemmts by sucim devices as capital flight abroad and barter transactions. The consequent massive reforms in tax iaws, tax admismistration, and in the capital market regulations proved effective 2°I ngenious tax incentives, such as granting tax credits for the purchase of shares in time so-called 157 Funds (specially created mutual investment funds), which are then used to purchase new and secondary equity issues, stinsulated the development of equity markets and promoted savings.
25 The government, in effect, used the tax system to elicit savings, but rehed on the newly developed capital market and the price system to allocate time savimmgs timus created.
But the simmgle force which contributed most to the decelerated inflatiosm was the government's conscious and deliberate policy of reducing deficits. The abandonment of inflation as a savings-investment technology must he credited for checking inflation, not the indexation per se. The adoption of indexation, coincideimt witlm time move toward less inflationary policies, served primarily to eliminate the inflation-induced income distribution. Its contribution to the deceleration of inflation was accommodative rather than causal.
Economic growtlm in Brazil can he explained at least partially in ternms of time increase in forced savings induced by chammged tax laws. In addition, the increase in allocative efficiency arising from the market direction of resource flows may be construed as a contributing factor to the observed growth in Brazil.
It must be smoted that in Brazil there are relatively small amounts of outstanding monetary contracts. Since tIme existence of monetary contracts complicates the implenmentatiomm of indexation, it is likely that opposition to suclm a proposal would be more muted in a country like Brazil than in the Usmited States.
Effect of Indexation on Existing Contracts and Institutions
Professor Friedman strongly favored the issuance of the purchasing power bond in 1951 and based the continuation of his advocacy mainly on equity and ethical grounds. He subsequently broadened the scope of isis proposal by immelunlismg private securities' anni time inconme tax systems (1973) . Reinforced by the "economic miracle" wrouglmt by Brazil with asm assist from "monetary correction," assd cosnpelIed by accelerating inflation domestically, ime has recently mounted a wgorous canmpaigmm for indexation reminiscemmt of his advocacy of freely-fluctuating exchange rates and monetarism. 25
Writing 0mm October 29, 1973, he conjectured timat the -time is ripe for private purchasing power bommds. A breakthrough awaits only our imnaginative bond underwriter."20 The recently annosmnced issue by Citicorp, a bank holding compammy anchored by the First National City Bank, New York, seems to be the response to Friedman's challenge. It has a provision for a variable interest rate one percemst above the Treasury bill rate and redemption options at face values twice a year. This particular instrument mnay be interpreted as a form of de facto purchasing power bond if one regards changes in the Treasury bill rate as reflecting only the changes in the actual, rather than the anticipated, inflation rate. To the extent that time changes in the Treasury bill rate incorporate changes in the underlying real interest rate. tlmis instrument would have the added feature of reducing relative price risk as well.
30
In order to explaims the above assertion, let us analyze the relationship which would hold between an indexed and a smonimmdexed bond. Abstracting from risk-aversion, at time time of issue time interest rate set for a nonindexed bond would exceed the rate on an indexed bond by the expected rate of inflation. Assume for simplicity that both are consols (bonds without maturity dates) and the indexed bond is protected for the full value of interest payments-What would happen to the market (present) values of tlmese bonds as inflationary expectations change? Market value of the indexed bond would be invariant with changed expectations of inflation, whereas that of the nonindexed bond would suove inversely with the changes. As far as the change in the real interest rate is concerned, both bonds would be affected, but the variability of the indexed bond would be greater "true" purchasing power bond protects the holder only against price level changes, while leaving the holder vnlnenable to relative price changes, tlmat is, the risk of changes in the real interest rate, which reflects the exchange rate between present and future consumption options.
for anticipated inflation.
5~A ssuming risk aversion, the relative attractiveness of the two bonds would crucially depend on the perceived relative variability of real immterest rates' 'and anticipated inflation rates. If tlme market judged timat time expected rates of inflation were more volatile than real interest rates, again assuming risk aversion, the indexed bond would be relatively more attractive. Thus, it would command higher prices and lower effective yields; that is, a borrower may borrow at lower yield with the indexed bond than with the nonismdexed bond. Available evidence from Israel is suggestive in this regard. tm2
The sometime advanced argument that the introduction of indexed bonds would adversely affect the price of existing bonds must then implicitly assume that the mere introduction would raise either the expected rate of inflation, which is debatable, or the real rate of interest, which is doubtful. Time market price of existing bonds may be substantially below the original sale price, but this would be unrelated to the introduction of indexed bonds. The reduction would simply reflect the past history of muovements in the market rates of interest, which reflect both the changes in the real rate and the inflation rate.
Time introduction of indexed bonds would adversely affect the issuer of new nonindexed bonds. Under the assumed condition of relatively greater attractiveness for indexed bonds, the implied higher costs of borrowing for the incumbent borrowers measm lower wealth for tlme incumbent "eonvesmtional" borrowers. If there are legal impediments to issuing an indexed bond (possibly clue to the statutory limits 0mm hotls the lending and borrowing rates), the incumbents would lose wealth as the new indexed bonds joined the competition for funds.
It would not be surprising if those who stand to lose by the innovation would try to block access to the market in order to protect their wealth. The current lively counter-offensive by the thrift institutions to deny access to markets to the issuers of de facto 
purclmasing power bonds is instructive in this regard°5
The foregoing suggests that it is not so much the values of existing bonds hut the wealth of the existing equity owner and/or the viability of certain financial institutions wlmiclm are tlmreatened when indexed hommcls are introduced xvitlmout appropriate elmanges imm time whole spectrmmnm of legal asmd ismstitutional arrangements.
The harriers to time introdnmetion of indexation by the government and the private sectors are legal and economic. Indexing of income taxes and the issuance of index-linked government bommds would require legislative acts and the required legislation appears to entail significant political realignments. Opposition would appear to be concentrated in thrift industries sucim as savings and loan associations and mutual savings banks. The motive underlyismg opposition to indexation would appear to be the entailed loss in wealth consequent to the introduction of indexation wmthout any provisiomm to "socialize loss," such as a guaranteed purchase at par of the assets held by these institutions.
As noted recently by Professor Friedman, indexing ineomne taxes would help facilitate the introduction of a private index-linked bond by exenmpting interest adjustments fronm the income tax levy. Indexing goversmment securities would also stimulate the introduction of private indexed bonds by competitive forces as well as by preempting the state usury restrictions on loan contracts. The availability of index-linked instruments would facilitate the spread of indexation by providing hedging opportunities to snmch financial intermediaries as savings and loan associations, life insurance companies, and commercial banks.
Longer-Term Contracts Would Result
Under indexation longer-term eosmtracts would likely result -a development which, on net, could he regarded as a benefit. Under a nonindexed reginme mvith high and variable rates of inflation, the tendency toward shortening of maturity emerges because shom-tterm instruments provide a relatively higher degree of inconme and capital certainty. The above holds as long as the perceived variability in the expected rates of inflation is greater than timat imm time real interest rate. The Israeli experience, referred to earlier, tends to confirm timis view.
Effective indexatioms would simelter time parties to a monetary contract from the effects of unammticipated The concept of inflation can he defirsed only for an economy where nmoney buys goods and goods buy money. Inflation is the sustained depreciation in the purchasing power of mnoney and is measured by the construction of an appropriate price index. The reference to appropriate is crucial in underscoring the difficulty involved in any attempt to construct a general price imdex. It brings into the open time fundamental issue of the appropriate universe of commodities in constructing the price index.
Should it commtaism intermediate goods or orsly final goods? Simonid it include only newly-produced goods and exclude all existing assets such as land and imouses? Should it inelmmde only the currently produced flow of services (such as imousing services as measured by implicit rental payments) and exclude the currently produced sources of the future flow of services (sucim as houses and automobiles)? Tlmese are weighty and important issues to wlmich satisfactory answers are yet to be given, even at a purely conceptual level. 
SUMMARY
If we abstract from Imistory and igimore time inimerited stock of outstanding immonetary contracts and specialized fissammcial immstitutiomms, time case for ismdexation appears persnmasive. It wotmlcl prevemmt time esmmergemmce of an ummimmtesmdecl distribution of immeome and tlmerehv serve time cause of fairmmess. If indexatiosm of income taxes ammd government obligations facilitates aim effective elmeek on "usmautlmorized" growtim in time govermmmemmt's simare of resources, its adoptiomm would likely lead to governnmemmt policies wimicim would moderate time rate of immflatiomm rather tlsamm exaeerlmate it. Ismflationary policies would ismdeed lose cossstituency since the "honey" mvould have beemm sucked from such policies.
But, surely, time above reasonismg is immeomplete. It leaves ummammswered time questiomm of lmow and mvimy time simifting of time balance of political posver, required to introduce indexation, xvommld occur. Indexation per se would mmot cause the realigmsmemmt. Rather, realignment, shommid it occmmr, would he a reflection of the "exogenous" simift ism attitudes and distributiomms of effective political power.
We cansmot, however, escape from our past mmor remake the world anew at will by abolislming existing nmonetary obligatiosms ammd financial immstitutions. We imave an inimerited stock of monetary commtracts whicim iImcorporate past expectations of the paths of price level movements. Simotmld time ismtroduetion of indexed bonds cause time previously imeld price expectations to eimamsge, a fortuitous cimammge tim the relative wealth of sellers and lsolders of outstasmdimmg monetary contracts would ensue. Specifically, should time anticipated (and experienced) rate of inflation fall as a consequence of time introduction of ismclexed bonds, mmet monetary debtors would lose wealth relative to mmet nmormetarv creditors'-, conversely-, net creditors wommid lose wealtim relative to mmet debtors in time case where indexation ismduces a Imiglmer anticipated rate of inflation tlman was formerly held.
We imave a set of immstitutiomms operatimmg ummder ismimerited legal and regulatory comsstraints wimich restrict their rammge of asset amid liability elmoices. Slmould immdexation be perceived as inimical to time vested interests of certaimm groups, oppositiosm to its adoption would undoubtedly be mobilized in time absence of a credible plan to "socialize" time total cost of transition. Advocacy of indexation seldom is accompanied by such a plan, and lsenee will be met by the organized opposition of those wlmo are likely to be hm-t by its
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adoptiomm. Time oppositiomm will not likely he assuaged by a demommstratiomm that indexatiorm will serve the general interest.
We can discern the followissg timree possible denouenments for imsdeximmg govermmmmmemmt revemmues ammd obligations:
(1) Indexatloim may be adopted over opposition through the contest of relative political power.
(2) Indexation nmay be adopted with the consent of the former opposition when a credible plan to compensate the potential losers is appended as a rider. Stmch a plan may include a guaranteed purchase at par of existing mortgages held by thrift institutions.
(3) Indexation may, of eosmrse, be rejected even if the balance of benefits over losses is shown to be positive.
As noted earlier. imowever, a partial indexatiomm in the spimere of private wage cosmtracts-and puimlic pensioms comstracts is witlm us aireanly. The questiomm of removing time legal barriers to ismdeximmg private bass assd deposit cOmmtrnmcts still remaimms. TIme recent proposal by time Canadiasm govermmmmment to "immflatiomm-proof" its income tax structure nmav be time wave of time future. The overridimmg questimsmm, imowever, is time degree of restraismt that revemsmme immdexatinsmm wotmid inmpose 0mm time govermmmnemmt's demmmmmncm for a greater slmare of scarce resources.
